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Abstract
This article will examine how Margaret Thatcher utilised the Prime Ministerial 
power of Cabinet ministerial appointment between 1979 and 1990. The article 
will utilise the Norton taxonomy on the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) 
to determine the ideological disposition (non-Thatcherite versus Thatcherite) of 
her Cabinet members across her eleven years in office. It will assess the ideologi-
cal trends in terms of appointments, promotions and departures from Cabinet and it 
will use archival evidence to explore the advice given to Thatcher to assist her deci-
sion-making. Through this process the article will demonstrate how Thatcher was 
more ideologically balanced than academics have traditionally acknowledged when 
discussing her Cabinet selections. Moreover, the article will also demonstrate the 
significance attached to media presentation skills to her decision-making, thus chal-
lenging the emphasis on ideology as a dominant determinant of Cabinet selection.
Keywords Conservative party · Margaret  Thatcher · Thatcher government 1979–
1990 · Ministerial selection · Cabinet ministers
Introduction
This article contributes to the academic literature on the political leadership of Mar-
garet Thatcher, focusing on the powers of patronage that a Prime Minister possesses 
in terms of Cabinet selection. The article will address the following three research 
questions: first, how ideologically balanced were her Cabinets; second, did she dem-
onstrate a bias towards Thatcherites in terms of promotions into Cabinet; and, third, 
was there a bias towards non-Thatcherites in terms of departures from Cabinet? In 
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answering these questions, the article will use archival evidence to gain insights into 
the factors shaping her decision-making on Cabinet selection.
These questions demonstrate how patronage can also be seen as a tool of party 
management—i.e., to what extent should the Prime Minister respond to their fac-
tions’ expectation that they should be dominant numerically within the ministerial 
and Cabinet ranks? (King 1994, p. 210). On that conundrum, there is a general con-
sensus within the academic literature on how Thatcher demonstrated a bias in favour 
of ideologically like-minded Conservatives—Holmes has argued that through Cabi-
net reshuffles Thatcher ‘outmanoeuvred’ the non-Thatcherites (Holmes 1989, p. 91); 
Smith (1994, p. 343) spoke of her ‘removing’ them; whilst Thomas (1998, p. 37) 
claimed that the ‘changes she made were not primarily on the grounds of compe-
tence, but in order to shift the ideological balance’ of Cabinet. Yet Thatcher used 
her memoirs to suggest that ideological balance within Cabinet was important to her 
(Thatcher 1993, p. 418).
This article attempts to identify the evidence to support the claim that Thatcher 
sought ideological balance, as against the academic assumptions that she failed to 
do so. Assuming that ideology mattered is a legitimate claim given the following. 
First, ideology influenced voting in the Conservative Party leadership election of 
1975 through which she won the leadership. Cowley and Bailey (2000) have identi-
fied how those identifiable with the right wing were more likely to vote for Thatcher 
in the leadership ballots, and those identifiable with the one nation left were more 
likely to vote for Edward Heath in the first ballot and then William Whitelaw in 
the second ballot. Second, not only did ideology matter within the PCP, but we can 
assume that when they entered office after victory at the General Election of 1979: 
those who had been her backers would expect ministerial rewards, but those who 
had not supported her would still hope for ministerial advancement (Evans 2009, p. 
102). Thatcher was thus the ‘monopoly supplier’ of a good in short supply for which 
there was an enormous demand (King and Allen 2010, p. 251).
The Norton taxonomy
The article exploits Norton’s taxonomy of the PCP in the late Thatcher era. Nor-
ton identified the ideological composition of the PCP (as of 1989), in order to 
determine whether her leadership had acted as a ‘transmission belt’ for the crea-
tion of a Thatcherite PCP and the erosion of one-nation Conservative sentiment 
(Norton 1990). Norton constructed a spectrum of Conservative thought and he 
positioned each Conservative parliamentarian on it.1 He determined the position 
1 Over time the Norton taxonomy would become a dated representation of the ideological fault-lines 
within British Conservatism. Its focus on the economic divide (wet-dry) underplayed the importance of 
the conflicts over European policy and social, sexual and moral issues and how these should be consid-
ered separately. This is because, within the post-Thatcherite PCPs, many Conservatives did ‘not adhere 
to a straightforward distinction based on the left of Conservatism being economically wet, Europhile 
and social liberal, and the right of Conservatism being economically dry, Eurosceptic and socially con-
servative….[as]… a lot of cross-cutting opinions, or zig-zagging, exist[ed] across these three ideologi-
cal dividing lines’, thus explaining the party management difficulties for leaders after Thatcher (Heppell, 
2020: 18).
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of each member via the use of division lists, membership of party groupings and 
public comment, in relation to the dominant ideological divides of Conservatism 
in the Thatcherite era—i.e., economic policy; European policy and social, sexual 
and moral issues. The Norton taxonomy subdivided the PCP into the following 
groupings:
(1) Critics The non-Thatcherite wing comprised a ‘wet’ grouping (strongly interven-
tionist, pro-European, socially liberal) and the less rebellious and more biddable 
‘damp’ grouping (moderately interventionist, pro-European, socially liberal). 
In the 1989 PCP Norton identified that the Thatcherite critics comprised 67 
Conservative parliamentarians (wets 27 and damps 40).
(2) Loyalists Located within the centre ground were loyalist Conservatives—i.e., 
those who lacked strong ideological commitments and whose loyalty was to the 
existing leadership and policy positions. As of 1989 Norton identified this to 
be the strongest grouping within the PCP, totalling 217 and over half of their 
parliamentary representation.
(3) Populists Norton identified a distinctive populist grouping (n = 17) who were 
interventionist on economic issues, but Eurosceptic and socially conservative.
(4) Thatcherites Norton identified that as of 1989 a total of 71 PCP members could 
be defined as Thatcherites. Norton argued that there were three variants of 
Thatcherite: the neo-liberals who were economically dry; socially liberal and 
Eurosceptic (n = 15); the Thatcher group who hold a dry economic viewpoint 
and although essentially sceptical vis-à-vis further European integration and 
moderately socially conservative, their primary loyalty was to the style of lead-
ership that Thatcher embodied (n = 30); and the Tory right—economically dry, 
moderately sceptical on Europe yet their primary ideological focus was on tra-
ditional social conservatism (n = 26).
What was intriguing about the Norton taxonomy was that the two blocs on the 
non-Thatcherite left and Thatcherite right were significantly outnumbered by the 
loyalist centrist group within the PCP—i.e., 18.1 percent were critics of Thatch-
erism and 19.1 percent were Thatcherites (Norton 1990). This article argues that 
utilising the Norton taxonomy provides a legitimate basis for examining the ideo-
logical composition of the Cabinet across the Thatcher era.
Before proceeding three caveats need to be acknowledged. First, the Norton tax-
onomy lists the ideological categorisation of Conservative parliamentarians from 
the 1987–1992 Parliament (n = 356) but it does not capture the ideological positions 
of those who were Cabinet ministers in the period of 1979 to 1987 but no longer 
members of Parliament after 1987. With this study excluding the small number of 
Cabinet members who were based within the House of Lords, the number of Cabinet 
members the Norton study covers is forty-seven. Of those thirteen were not located 
ideologically within the Norton taxonomy as they had left Parliament at the General 
Elections of 1983 or 1987. In these cases, their parliamentary voting behaviour has 
been profiled, as had their membership of party groups and public comment (as per 
the methods that Norton used himself) in order to locate them.
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Second, whilst the paper assumes that the ideological composition of the Cabi-
net will have been a consideration when Thatcher was appointing ministers, it also 
acknowledges that ministerial preferment will be a by-product of other variables 
such as competence, age, experience, region, gender, loyalty or constituency margin-
ality. As such, when this paper examines the outputs of Thatcher’s Cabinet appoint-
ments and dismissals, from the inputs (the reasons why she made these choices) we 
are not claiming a direct correlation between ideological disposition of ministerial 
preferment, but highlighting the trends that existed between ideological disposition 
and her patronage (on these debates, see Heppell 2005, p. 150–1).
Third, in noting that other variables will be an influence on ministerial selection, 
we acknowledge that Prime Ministers do face constraints, as balances need to be 
found for reasons of political presentation, party management and succession plan-
ning. Moreover, given that ministers are primarily drawn from the House of Com-
mons, we also need to note that this is a small talent pool to select from (King and 
Allen 2010). One notable restriction will be the obstacles to female representation 
in Cabinet that this creates, as the male–female balance was respectively 331–8; 
384–13 and 359–17 across the three Parliaments of her tenure. Of that restricted 
talent pool, some will lack the administrative ability, or the intellect, temperament 
or ambition to hold ministerial office. Establishing who will be suitable for consid-
eration creates a powerbase for the Whips’ Office, but their input will have a greater 
influence on junior ministerial appointments than Cabinet appointments. As junior 
ministerial posts act as a conveyer belt to the Cabinet then the preferences within the 
Whips’ Office itself can act as an influence on getting onto the ministerial ladder in 
the first place. Here it is worth noting the influence of long-standing whip, Tristan 
Garel-Jones, who used his Blue-Chip grouping of elite Tories to advance the minis-
terial careers of like-minded (economically damp and pro-European) Conservatives, 
to the lower rungs of the ministerial ladder (Moore 2013, p. 646).
Cabinet ministers 1979–1990: overall ideological profile
Our first research question asks whether Thatcher secured and maintained ideologi-
cal balance within her Cabinet? Table 1 provides aprofile covering the ideological 
composition of the Cabinet covering all twenty-one Cabinets that she constructed. 
Table 2 then notes the ideological disposition of each individual who was a member 
of the Cabinet at some time between 1979 and 1990. It is worth noting that some of 
her Cabinets were long standing—for example, her first Cabinet lasted from May 
1979 to January 1981- but the cumulative effect on resignations (enforced changes) 
alongside her deliberately timed reshuffles (selective dismissals) led to considerably 
more Cabinets in the latter years of her Prime Ministerial tenure. Her first four-year 
term had five Cabinets; her second four-year term had six Cabinets; and her final 
and truncated three-year term had ten Cabinets.
Using the Norton taxonomy as a basis for evaluation the findings suggest the 
following. The ideological balance of the first Cabinet—May 1979 to January 
1981—tilted in favour of the non-Thatcherites (eight) as compared to the Thatch-
erites (six) with the remainder defined as loyalist. This supports the view that some 
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Conservative had: e.g., Prior recalled that the balance looked ‘better for our wing 
of the party than I had dreamt possible’, with the ‘dissidents’, including himself, 
outnumbering her ‘main supporters’—Howe plus Keith Joseph, John Nott and John 
Biffen, whom Prior thought were ‘not a very impressive bunch’ (Prior 1986, p. 1).
That balance was adjusted most notably via the reshuffle in September 1981—
given the removals of Ian Gilmour and Mark Carlisle (non-Thatcherites) and the 
appointments of Lawson and Norman Tebbit (Thatcherites). This was clearly the 
intention of Thatcher herself—she wanted more of her economic supporters into 
Cabinet as ‘there were too many’ who ‘did not share’ her view (Thatcher 1993, p. 
149). That a shift had occurred was acknowledged by some of the new entrants of 
1981. Lawson recalled that Thatcher had now ‘secured a Cabinet with a Thatch-
erite majority’ (Lawson 1992, p. 123); Norman Fowler described it was the most 
Table 1  The Ideological 
Composition of the Thatcher 
Cabinets 1979–1990
No member of the Norton ‘populists’ grouping was appointed to 
Cabinet
n = Based on members of PCP in Cabinet and excludes members of 








May 1979–Jan 1981 (19) 8 5 6
Jan 1981–Sept 1981 (19) 7 6 6
Sept 1981–Apr 1982 (20) 5 7 8
Apr 1982–Jan 1983 (19) 5 6 8
Jan 1983–June 1983 (19) 5 7 7
Second Term 1983–87
June 1983–Oct 1983 (18) 3 8 7
Oct 1983–Sept 1984 (18) 3 8 7
Sept 1984–Sept 1985 (18) 3 8 7
Sept 1985–Jan 1986 (19) 5 7 7
Jan 1986–Mar 1986 (19) 4 9 6
Mar 1986–June 1987 (19) 4 9 6
Third Term 1987–90
June 1987–Oct 1987 (18) 4 9 5
Oct 1987–Jan 1988 (18) 4 9 5
Jan 1988–July 1988 (18) 4 9 5
July 1988–July 1989 (19) 4 10 5
July 1989–Oct 1989 (20) 5 10 5
Oct 1989–Jan 1990 (20) 5 11 4
Jan 1990–Mar 1990 (20) 5 11 4
Mar 1990–July 1990 (20) 5 11 4
July 1990–Nov 1990 (20) 5 11 4
Nov 1990–(20) 6 11 3
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‘extensive’ of her reshuffles (Fowler 1991, p. 155); whilst Norman Tebbit, described 
it as a ‘turning point’ as the ‘balance in the Cabinet was decisively changed’ (Tebbit 
1989, p. 181).
That ideological balance was a consideration within the calculations of Cabinet 
formation is evident from the advice that Thatcher received from her confidants. For 
example, in August 1982, her Parliamentary Private Secretary, Ian Gow, offered the 
following insights on the ideological composition of the Cabinet: ‘putting it at its 
worst, we now have a majority in the Cabinet’ and as ‘the balance now is better than 
at any time during your administration’ even if ‘this is not as strong a majority as 
we would like’ (Thatcher, MSS, Churchill Archive Centre CAC, ‘Shuffle: thoughts 
on MT’s strength in Cabinet’, THCR 2/7/3/1 f29, 25 August 1982). However, the 
1981 reshuffles did not constitute the start of a trend for reducing the non-Thatcher-
ite membership of the Cabinet. Thereafter, in the first parliament of 1979 to 1983, 
the only ideologically significant adjustment was the replacement of the Thatcherite, 
Nott, (in January 1983) with the ideologically centrist and loyalist, Tom King.
If the sum total was that the Cabinet was more Thatcherite and less non-Thatcher-
ite at the end of the first term than it was at the beginning of their time in office, then 
what patterns can be identified in her second term? Thatcher used her post-General 
Election reshuffle to further reduce non-Thatcherite membership of her Cabinet as 
she dismissed the non-Thatcherite, Pym, as Foreign Secretary. However, she did not 
use this as an opportunity to advance younger Thatcherites into the Cabinet—the 
Thatcherites entered the second Thatcher term with seven members (the same as 
before the reshuffle) and they would end the 1983 to 1987 Parliament numbering just 
six, which was the same number of Thatcherites when Thatcher first entered Down-
ing Street back in 1979. No further erosion of non-Thatcherite sentiment within the 
Cabinet was evident by 1987 as table one demonstrates. It is worth noting how the 
September 1985 reshuffle, which led to the elevations to Cabinet of the Kenneth’s—
Baker and Clarke—and to be discussed in more detail later on—involved Thatcher 
being explicitly advised of the following:
You need two or three high-profile wets to come into the Cabinet. Policies will 
hardly be affected in the next two years, but perceptions will be…. Prospec-
tive cabinet members should have one particular qualification: they must not 
be ‘one of us’ (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, ‘Wolfson notes: Ministerial Changes’, 
THCR 1/14/14 f129, 22 August 1985).
What of her final term of office between 1987 and 1990? What is most revealing 
from using the Norton taxonomy in relation to Cabinet appointments is the dis-
covery that her final Cabinet was not that dissimilar to her first Cabinet in terms 
of ideological balance—i.e., just as she entered office with a Cabinet in which the 
non-Thatcherites were double in number than the Thatcherites (by eight to four) the 
same was true in November 1990, as she had six non-Thatcherites as compared to 
three Thatcherites. This finding should be viewed as being problematic for politi-
cal historians in terms of replicating the assumption that Thatcher simply removed 
the wets—her critics—from within her Cabinet—as per those comments identi-
fied in our introduction. By her new appointments in her final term—twelve in 
total- three were critics (Chris Patten, David Hunt and William Waldegrave); seven 
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were centrists and only two were Thatcherites (Norman Lamont and Peter Lilley). 
Thatcher had contributed to the construction of an essentially non-Thatcherite Cabi-
net at time of the Conservative Party leadership election of November 1990.
This had consequences as the Cabinet were central to her removal from the party 
leadership, after she had defeated the challenger, Heseltine, by 204 votes to 152 in 
the first parliamentary ballot. Although victorious she was short (by four votes) of 
the additional fifteen percent lead rule that existed in the Conservative Party leader-
ship election rules at that time, thus forcing her to proceed to a second ballot (Hep-
pell 2008, pp. 80–83). To hold onto her existing levels of support, she needed, at a 
minimum, to maintain the backing of her own Cabinet, whereupon Thatcher realised 
that they were beginning to withhold their support. With some Cabinet members 
now prepared to resign unless she withdrew, she realised that even if she did defeat 
Heseltine in the second ballot, she would ‘lack the authority to govern’ (Thatcher 
1993, pp. 851–853) whereupon she resigned.
Ideological disposition and cabinet appointments
Our second research question considers new appointments into Cabinet and asks 
whether Thatcher displayed a bias in favour of appointing Thatcherites. After the 
formation of her first Cabinet in May 1979, Thatcher conducted four reshuffles in her 
first term, drafting in a total of six new members of Cabinet. The new appointments 
in the respective reshuffles of 1981 showed her desire to advance more of her ideo-
logical sympathisers. Although Fowler (January) and Parkinson (September) were 
identifiable as loyalists, the other new entrants—Brittan (January) and then Tebbit 
and Lawson (September) were clearly ideological sympathisers (Norton 1990). Only 
one new entrant to Cabinet was appointed before the landslide General Election of 
1983 was secured, that being the ideologically centrist, King, as mentioned above.
In her second term, she drafted in a total of ten new Cabinet ministers across five 
reshuffles. During this period, Thatcher was more balanced in the ideological make-
up of her new appointments. The post-general election reshuffle (June 1983) saw 
Thatcher introduce into the Cabinet two figures who ideologically centrist—Jopling 
and Peter Rees, and later in the year she promoted to Cabinet the ideological sym-
pathising, Nicholas Ridley (September 1983). Of the seven additional new appoin-
tees to Cabinet in the remainder of the second Thatcher term, it is worth noting that 
alongside another three ideological centrists—John McGregor; Paul Channon and 
Malcolm Rifkind—Thatcher appointed three non-Thatcherites in the shape of Doug-
las Hurd, plus Clarke and Baker. The only advancement secured by the Thatcherite 
wing thereafter in the 1983–1987 Parliament was the appointment of John Moore in 
1986 (Campbell 2003, p. 225).
Thatcher was an admirer of Baker, despite his Heathite credentials, because he 
was a ‘superb communicator’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 420) and in her memoirs she would 
note that for ‘every few Josephs and Ridleys you needed at least one Ken Baker to 
concentrate on communicating the message’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 758). The focus on 
presentation was central to the advice that Thatcher received in preparation for the 
September 1985 reshuffle. On potential ‘new faces’ Thatcher was informed by her 
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Margaret Thatcher 1979–1990 *
Geoffrey Howe 1979–1990 *
John Biffen 1979–1987 *
William Whitelaw 1979–1988 *
Norman St John Stevas 1979–1981 *
Ian Gilmour 1979–1981 *
Peter Walker 1979–1990 *
Francis Pym 1979–1983 *
Mark Carlisle 1979–1981 *
James Prior 1979–1984 *
David Howell 1979–1983 *
Michael Heseltine 1979–1986 *
Patrick Jenkin 1979–1985 *
Keith Joseph 1979–1986 *
Humphrey Atkins 1979–1982 *
George Younger 1979–1989 *
Angus Maude 1979–1981 *
John Nott 1979–1983 *
Nicholas Edwards 1979–1987 *
Leon Brittan 1981–1986 *
Norman Fowler 1981–1990 *
Norman Tebbit 1981–1987 *
Nigel Lawson 1983–1989 *
Cecil Parkinson 1981–83; 1987- *
Tom King 1983– *
Peter Rees 1983–1985 *
Michael Jopling 1983–1987 *
Nicholas Ridley 1983–1990 *
Douglas Hurd 1984– *
John McGregor 1985– *
Kenneth Clarke 1985– *
Kenneth Baker 1985– *
Paul Channon 1986–1989 *
Malcolm Rifkind 1986– *
John Moore 1986–1989 *
John Major 1987– *
John Wakeham 1987– *
Tony Newton 1988– *
Norman Lamont 1989– *
Peter Brooke 1989– *
David Waddington 1989– *
John Gummer 1989– *
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advisors that they ‘must be good communicators’ and those identified as the exam-
ples, Baker, McGregor and Clarke were all promoted to Cabinet, even though two of 
them (Baker and Clarke) were non-Thatcherites (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, Sherbourne 
minutes on reshuffle, THCR, 1/14/14 f136, 22 August 1985). As Party Chair, Tebbit, 
concurred with much of this advice and recommended Baker and Clarke, both of 
whom he defined as a ‘safe pair of hands’, as was Channon, although his advance-
ment was delayed until the 1986 reshuffle (intriguingly Tebbit’s suggestion that the 
Thatcherite, Lamont, should join the Cabinet was ignored) (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, 
Tebbit letter to Thatcher, THCR, 1/14/14 f 123, 27 August 1985).
Of the others who were identified as ‘good communicators’ there was Moore 
and Patten but also Tony Newton—it was a case of promotions delayed, as all three 
would later join the Cabinet, although Thatcher rejected the advice to switch the 
Heseltine to the DHSS and Walker to Defence, even though both suggestions were 
made on the basis of them both being ‘good communicators’ (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, 
Sherbourne minutes on reshuffle, THCR, 1/14/14 f136, 22 August 1985). Ultimately, 
Thatcher followed the advice of Wolfson in two key ways: first, that it would be a 
‘mistake’ to ‘sack’ Walker, or ‘even move him from Energy ‘where he is a perceived 
success’; and second, it would be ‘illogical’ to move Heseltine on from Defence 
(had she done so  the crisis that was the Westland Affair could have been averted) 
but if she must the recommendation was Trade and Industry (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, 
‘Wolfson notes: Ministerial Changes’, THCR 1/14/14 f129, 22 August 1985).
The third term Thatcher Cabinet was significantly more volatile than the first and 
second terms. Twelve new Cabinet appointments were made, which were made across 
ten reshuffles, including the one that took place in the immediate aftermath of the Gen-
eral Election victory of 1987 (Fowler 1991, pp. 286–288). The majority of the new 
appointees were ideologically centrists within what Norton defined as the loyalist cat-
egorisation. Those included for promotions included Newton and Gummer, as well 
as John Wakeham, Peter Brooke and David Waddington, but they also included two 
defined as loyalists that require further consideration. First, Major was appointed as 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury in June 1987 and although Norton defined him as a 
loyalist as of 1989, the ideological base of his vote when winning the leadership of the 
Conservative Party was located on the Thatcherite right of the PCP (Cowley and Garry 
1998). Second, although the Norton taxonomy positioned Michael Howard—promoted 
to the Cabinet in 1990—as a loyalist, he was to emerge thereafter in the 1990s as being 
more identifiable with the Thatcherite right (Heppell 2002). If Howard is categorised 









Chris Patten 1989– *
Michael Howard 1990– *
Peter Lilley 1990– *
David Hunt 1990– *
William Waldegrave 1990– *
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as a loyalist based on his conduct in that era, then that means that Thatcher advanced 
into Cabinet only two who were ideologically aligned to her in the whole of her final 
term—Lamont and Lilley. There is a certain irony in the following fact. We know from 
the literature on the Conservative Party leadership election of 1990 that the non-Thatch-
erite wets tended to vote for Heseltine and the dries voted for Thatcher (Cowley and 
Garry 1998) and yet three of the last five new entrants into Cabinet (in 1989 and 1990) 
were clearly identifiable with the wets—Patten, Hunt and Waldegrave. On the appoint-
ment of Waldegrave, Thatcher recalled how her Chief Whip, Tim Renton, lobbied hard 
for Waldegrave to be appointed, and even though she knew he was not an ‘ally’ she 
claimed that ‘I had never kept talented people out of my Cabinets just because they 
were not of my way of thinking, and I was not going to start now’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 
835).
What emerges from the archives is the different emphasis placed upon the reshuffles 
during this term. The post-General Election reshuffle (June 1987) was identified by the 
press as being significant in terms of bringing in ‘new talent’ (much of it below Cabi-
net) which gave the government ‘new dynamism’, with those advancing being defined 
as the ‘young communicators’ (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, Press Digest for Thatcher—Gen-
eral Election Aftermath, Cabinet Reshuffle, THCR 3/5/69 f42, 16 June 1987). The pri-
mary focus of the June 1988 reshuffle was not so much on new entrants—the centrist 
Newton being the only new face—but was on the decision to split the Department of 
Health and Security into two departments. Clarke was made Health Secretary, a fact 
which the press briefing provided to Thatcher in the immediate aftermath of the reshuf-
fle placed a considerable focus upon. The Mirror said she ‘must have gritted [her] teeth 
to appoint Clarke because he is not [a] natural supporter’; the Express described him as 
‘capable’ but ‘distinctly dampish’ and Thatcher may have been irked by the suggestion 
of the Mail that Clarke was a ‘future Tory leader’ (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, Press Digest 
for Thatcher, THCR 3/5/81 f193, 26 July 1988).
Although Major was not a new entrant to the Cabinet in the reshuffle of July 1989, 
he was the main press focus on that reshuffle, as he was dramatically promoted from 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury to the Foreign Office. When she offered the post to 
Major, he was initially reticent about accepting  what was a significant promotion, fear-
ing that ‘people will assume I’m there just to carry out your bidding’ and as such he 
asked whether ‘others’ were ‘better qualified’, such as Hurd? (Major 1999, p. 112). 
Hurd would secure the Foreign Office months later, when Major was moved back to the 
Treasury to replace Lawson as Chancellor. Major would recall that Thatcher was think-
ing to offer the Foreign Office to Parkinson, but Major argued that Hurd was the ‘obvi-
ous choice’ (Major 1999, pp. 133–135). Succession planning was said to be a factor in 
the appointment of Major to the Foreign Office back in July 1989—Thatcher rational-
ised that ‘if he was to have a hope of becoming Party leader, it would be better if he had 
held one of the three great offices of state’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 757).
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Ideological disposition and cabinet departures
Our third research question asks to what extent was there evidence of an ideologi-
cal bias in terms of the exits from Cabinet? This calculation is more complex than 
that on appointments as some exits from Cabinet are voluntary and do not qualify as 
dismissals, although it is conceivable that a Cabinet minister might choose to resign 
to avert the possibility of being dismissed. There is also the question of the motive 
for an enforced removal—it may be ideological, but it could also be motivated by a 
desire for a generational shift as a Prime Minister eases out older Cabinet members 
and of course Cabinet ministers may be removed on the grounds of incompetence.
Of those who exited the Cabinet in the first term it is clear than perceptions of 
competence played a part in the resignation of Humphrey Atkins in the aftermath 
of the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands—Atkins was a Minister of State in the 
Foreign Office (but Cabinet ranked as the lead Commons spokesperson on Foreign 
affairs) and stepped down along with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington. The 
departure of Angus Maude in January 1981 was due to age (he was approaching 
seventy years old) and by mutual agreement (Thatcher 1993, p. 29). Of those exiting 
in the January and September 1981 reshuffles that ideology was a driver is not dis-
puted. In advance of her January 1981 reshuffle Clive Whitmore, who was Thatch-
er’s principal private secretary between 1979 and 1982, recommended  the removal 
from Cabinet of the non-Thatcherite St John Stevas, whom Campbell argued was the 
most ‘expendable’ and the ‘softest target amongst the wets’ (Thatcher MSS, CAC, 
Whitmore minute to MT ("Version 2"), THCR 1/3/6 f179, 2 January 1981; Camp-
bell 2003, p. 225).
In the lead up to the September 1981 reshuffle Thatcher received advice from 
Derek Howe, (her political secretary) based on the feedback from a group known as 
‘fox and goose’, who were group of trusted Conservative backbenchers whom Howe 
sounded out for their insights. It is interesting to note what findings were acted upon 
and what findings were not acted upon in the subsequent reshuffle. The suggestion 
that Gilmour ‘would not be missed’ was shared by Thatcher and acted upon; as was 
the suggestion that it was ‘imperative’ that Joseph was moved onto a new ministry, 
whereupon he was drafted into Education after leaving Industry. However, despite 
the failings of the loyalist Howell at Energy (who had ‘failed to communicate our 
policy or explain it to the public’ which explained why there was ‘widespread criti-
cism’) he avoided the sack, and moved sideways to Transport (he was sacked two 
years later, however). Thatcher also rejected the advice to remove Whitelaw from 
the Home Office, despite ‘criticism’ of his performance, which was said to be ‘not 
confined to one section of the parliamentary party’ (Thatcher MSS, CAC, Whitmore 
minute to MT ("Version 2"), THCR 1/3/6 f179, 2 January 1981).
The reshuffle of September 1981 was clearly critical and represents the moment 
in which Thatcher sought to gain greater control over Cabinet by altering its ideo-
logical makeup and limiting the ideological opposition to her. It would generate a 
considerable amount of press praise and criticism. In the aftermath of the controver-
sial September 1981 reshuffle Thatcher was provided with a summary of the press 
coverage. The left-ward leaning print media were scathing in their criticism with the 
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Guardian coverage summarised as follows: Thatcher ‘fails utterly at first test at good 
management’ and in doing so she has ‘not enhanced’ her position and has ‘acceler-
ated’ the moment when the Conservatives ‘will feel there must be an alternative’, 
which contrasted sharply with the Express—‘Maggie dries out wets’; the Sun—
‘Maggie’s Monday Massacre’; and the Daily Star—‘purge of wets’; (Thatcher MSS, 
CAC, ‘Press Summary for the PM’, THCR, 3/5/9 f36, 15 September 1981).
On the reshuffles of 1981 Lawson argued that Thatcher had reached the following 
calculations about the leading wets within her first Cabinet: first, there were wets 
whom ‘she feared might cause trouble on the backbenchers’, which Lawson argued 
was her opinion of Walker and Heseltine; and second, there was those who were 
‘politically incapable of causing trouble on the backbenchers’ which was her view of 
Carlisle and Gilmour (Lawson 1992, pp. 121–122).
Of those who exited the Cabinet in the second term, ideology was seen to be sig-
nificant in the two most high profiles dismissals from Cabinet. The post-1983 Gen-
eral Election reshuffle saw Pym removed as Foreign Secretary, and she followed this 
with the dismissal of Prior in the September 1984 reshuffle. It was through her treat-
ment of Pym and Prior, on the back of the dismissals of the St John Stevas, Carlisle 
and Gilmour back in 1981, that the purge of the ‘wets’ argument would develop—
e.g., Smith would describe how Thatcher was now exploiting her ‘massive major-
ity’ to ‘remove her remaining critics from the Cabinet’ via a process of ‘selective 
sackings’ (Smith 1994, pp. 351–352). These assumptions gain even greater credence 
when placed within the context of the resignation from the Cabinet of Heseltine in 
January 1986 in the aftermath of the Westland crisis.
Some of the less high-profile departures lacked ideological significance. In her 
memoirs Thatcher admits she dismissed Rees as Chief Secretary to the Treasury (in 
the September 1985 reshuffle) as Lawson was ‘irritated’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 419) 
by him, and the archives identify how as early as September 1984 how in the ‘next 
reshuffle’ removing Rees would be necessary as it was ‘now virtually a commit-
ment to Lawson’ (Thatcher MSS, CAC, Robin Butler minute for Thatcher, THCR 
1/14/14 f103, 11 September 1984). By May 1985 the archives show that no debate 
was required as Rees was now just listed, without explanation as to why, under the 
label ‘out’ (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, Robin Butler minute for Thatcher, THCR, 1/14/14 
f96, 23 May 1985). Although Tebbit lobbied for Thatcher to appoint an ideological 
bedfellow in Lamont in place of Rees, whom Tebbit also just labelled ‘out’, Thatcher 
rejected this guidance and selected the ideologically centrist, McGregor, to replace 
the ideologically centrist, Rees, as number two to Lawson. (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, 
Tebbit letter to Thatcher, THCR, 1/14/14 f 123, 27 August 1985). The other names 
repeatedly identified as needing to be removed from the Cabinet in the lead up to 
the September 1985 reshuffle was the ideologically centrist, Jenkin. Having served 
as Secretary of State for Social Services (1979–1981); Industry (1981–1983) and 
then Environment (since 1983) he was widely seen as dispensable by key advisors to 
Thatcher, possibly on account of the fact that he was approaching sixty. In May 1985 
Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary and later Cabinet Secretary, listed Jenkin 
as ‘out’ during a ‘preliminary discussion’ on the next Cabinet reshuffle, and this sen-
timent was similarly expressed by Wolfson and Tebbit, from the vantage point as 
Party Chair, who likewise listed Jenkin as suitable for dismissal. Thatcher, MSS, 
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CAC, Robin Butler minute for Thatcher, THCR, 1/14/14 f96, 23 May 1985; ‘Wolf-
son notes: Ministerial Changes’, THCR 1/14/14 f129, 22 August 1985; and Tebbit 
letter to Thatcher, THCR, 1/14/14 f 123, 27 August 1985).
But the departures of Rees and Jenkin were not ideologically loaded. The reshuf-
fle that Thatcher delivered in September 1985 could have been more significant had 
Thatcher acted upon the advice provided to her. Two names were cited as warrant-
ing dismissal from Cabinet, but both of them—Jopling (Minister for Agriculture) 
and King (Employment Secretary) would survive (Jopling until 1987 and King 
would last into the Major era, serving as Northern Ireland Secretary 1985–1989 
and Defence Secretary 1989–1992) (Thatcher MSS, CAC, Robin Butler minute 
for Thatcher, THCR 1/14/14 f103, 11 September 1984; Robin Butler minute for 
Thatcher, THCR, 1/14/14 f96, 23 May 1985; and Tebbit letter to Thatcher, THCR, 
1/14/14 f 123, 27 August 1985).
How can we explain the survival of both Jopling and King? The explana-
tion might lie in the advice of Sherbourne (Thatcher’s Political Secretary), who 
informed Thatcher that some of the ‘old faces’ should go and then listed them—
Jenkin, Rees, Joseph, King and Jopling—before making a reference to the ‘night of 
the long knives’ when Prime Minister Harold Macmillan engaged in his famously 
criticised 1962 reshuffle (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, Sherbourne minutes on reshuffle, 
THCR, 1/14/14 f136, 22 August 1985; on the ‘night of the long knives’). Given the 
infamy of the latter in terms of mismanaged Cabinet reshuffles (Alderman 1992) this 
might explain the caution that Thatcher demonstrated in the September 1985 reshuf-
fle, when, although five ministers were considered for dismissal only three exited. It 
is interesting, nonetheless to note that of the five recommended for dismissal, four 
were centrists and one was a Thatcherite, but none of them were amongst her critics.
That reshuffle was also significant for the demotion of Brittan from the Home 
Office. Thatcher came to feel that he was ‘not getting the message across on tel-
evision’ (Aitken 2013, p. 514) and as a consequence she switched him across to 
Trade and Industry. Her choice as his replacement would again reflect her willing-
ness to look beyond her ideological allies, as she turned to Hurd, in what he stated 
in her memoirs was ‘a successful appointment’, whom she selected because he was 
‘immensely reassuring to the police’ and because he ‘inspired a good deal of confi-
dence in the parliamentary party’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 419).
Thatcher was forced into further Cabinet changes in January 1986 as the West-
land affair led to the resignations of Heseltine as Defence Secretary and Brittan 
as Trade and Industry, but her reaction to the loss of a non-Thatcherite critic, in 
Heseltine and an ideological sympathiser, in Brittan, was not ideologically signifi-
cant. The centrist, Channon, was brought in to replace Brittan, and fellow centrist, 
Rifkind, entered the Cabinet as Scottish Secretary, to replace Younger, who was 
moved across to replace Heseltine at Defence. She did, however, balance out the 
departure  from Cabinet of Joseph, an ideological ally, in May 1986, with a like for 
like replacement in the shape of Moore. However, all three of these departures from 
Cabinet in 1986 were not conventional dismissals—Heseltine voluntarily resigned; 
Brittan was forced into a resignation due to criticism of his conduct during the West-
land affair; and Joseph departed by mutual agreement.
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Between 1987 and 1990 there were a significant number of departures from the 
Cabinet—some voluntary resignations; some forced resignations and some dis-
missals. Of the twelve who exited, four of them did so after the General Election 
of 1987, and of these none of them were critics of Thatcherism; two of them were 
centrists (Jopling and Edwards) and two of them (Biffen and Tebbit) were Thatch-
erites. The central reshuffle of 1988 (in July) may not have resulted in the dismissal 
of Moore, but the splitting up of the Department of Health and Social Security into 
two separate departments, with him remaining at Social Security, certainly hurt him 
politically. The press briefing delivered to Thatcher on how the reshuffle was cov-
ered was clear on this: The Mirror ‘Thatcher put the boot in golden boy Moore’; 
Today ‘Moore publicly humiliated’; The Daily  Mail ‘Moore’s empire is sliced in 
half’; The Sun ‘don’t cry for John Moore’ as ‘he failed in vital task of putting right 
the NHS’; The Independent ‘heavy blow’ for Moore; and The Times ‘a career set-
back for Moore’ who had been ‘widely spoken of as a potential leader of the party’ 
(Thatcher, MSS, CAC, Press Digest for Thatcher, THCR 3/5/81 f193, 26 July 1988).
The most planned for reshuffle of the third term—rather than those imposed upon 
Thatcher by resignations—was the July 1989 reshuffle. The archives reveal that the 
theme that fed into decision-making was as much presentational—and planning for 
the next General Election campaign—as it was ideological. For example, Charles 
Powell, who served as Thatcher’s Private Secretary, identified the following for her 
consideration prior to the reshuffle:
If you intend a major reshuffle before the election, it probably has to be this 
year to enable the Ministers to master their new jobs as fully as possible. There 
is a case for quite extensive changes. The feeling is widespread that Labour has 
youngish and impressive spokesmen in some areas, while some of yours are 
less impressive. You don’t want to go into the election with the risk that people 
will vote for a change of government when all they want is a change of faces. 
The time for a reshuffle is probably the end of July. It won’t have the same ele-
ment of surprise as last time. But Ministers seem to prefer to know their fate 
before the summer holidays. What follows is intended to help you clear your 
mind. The Big Three: you need to know what you want to do about the big 
three: Chancellor, Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary. I imagine you will 
want the Chancellor to go through to the election, always assuming that his 
personal plans provide for that. Your comments suggest that you may consider 
moving or even dropping the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary. It is 
only when you reach a decision on these three that a reshuffle can take shape 
(Thatcher, MSS, CAC, Powell minute for Thatcher, THCR 1/9/18A f13, 19 
March 1989).
Thatcher would reject the option of dropping or moving the Home Secretary 
(Hurd), but she decided to move Howe from the Foreign Office, demoting him to 
the position of Leader of the House of Commons, but softening the blow by offering 
him the title of Deputy Prime Minister. By this stage, their ideological alignment 
over economic strategy had been superseded by their disagreements over European 
integration, and also by a degree of personal hostility, but such was Howe’s standing 
Thatcher ‘dared not risk sacking’ him (Shepherd 1991, p. 1). Her treatment of Howe 
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and the promotion of Major to the Foreign Office would overshadow the dismiss-
als that generated considerably less press attention. She concluded that she would 
remove from Cabinet the ideological centrist, Channon, who had served as Trade 
and Industry Secretary 1986–1987 and then as Transport Secretary since 1987. In 
her memoirs her explanation as to why he was dismissed was that he was leading a 
department in which ‘public presentation was at a premium’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 756) 
and she replaced him with the more media-savvy, Parkinson. The other dismissal 
was one which Thatcher admitted was a ‘wrench’ as she concluded that Moore could 
no longer continue at the Department for Social Security, as he had failed to recover, 
‘at least psychologically, from the debilitating illness he suffered’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 
756).
Thatcher would lose a number of long-standing Cabinet members due to resigna-
tion in the period between October 1989 and October 1990. The loss of the ideologi-
cally centrist, Fowler, as Employment Secretary in January 1990, was motivated by 
a desire to ‘spend more time with his family’ (Walker et al 1990, p. 40). The other 
three departures were all from the Thatcherite wing of the party. Ridley was forced 
to resign as Trade and Industry Secretary in July 1990, after he described the pro-
posals for Economic and Monetary Union as a ‘German racket designed to take over 
the whole of Europe’ (Lawson 1990).
It was in that environment of policy disagreement and mutual mistrust that would 
lead to the resignations of both Lawson (in October 1989) and Howe (in October 
1990). Lawson resigned in opposition to the influence of her economics advisor, 
Alan Walters. Prior to his resignation he had issued Thatcher with an ultimatum—
she either dismissed Walters or he would resign—which Thatcher noted down as 
‘an absurd, indeed reprehensible proposition’. (Thatcher, MSS, CAC, MT memoir 
(‘Nigel Lawson’s Resignation’, Oct 1989, THCR 1/20/7 f4, 26 October 1989). The 
resignation of Howe symbolised the failings of her style of Prime Ministerial lead-
ership, and combined with their declining position within the opinions throughout 
1990, and the proximity of the next General Election inside eighteen months, led 
to the challenge (by Heseltine) to her leadership of the Conservative Party and her 
eventual resignation in November 1990. King and Allen argue that her alienation 
of Lawson and Howe, and  her earlier mistreatment of Heseltine, all of whom were 
politicians of substance—or what they call ‘big beasts’—represented her real ‘mis-
calculation’ and this was what ‘cost her’ the premiership (King and Allen 2010, p. 
275).
Analysis and conclusions
This aim of this paper was to use the Norton taxonomy as the basis for a numeri-
cal analysis of the ideological balances within the Thatcher Cabinets of 1979 and 
1990—i.e., the strength of opinion within the Thatcherite and non-Thatcherite fac-
tions within the Cabinet and how these evolved over the course of her time in office. 
The rationale for doing so was that this provided a basis upon which to validate 
or challenge the prevailing assumptions of the existing academic literature that we 
identified in the introduction. To do this we constructed three research questions that 
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we wanted to test—a). how ideologically balanced were her respective Cabinets; b). 
was there evidence of a bias towards Thatcherites with regard to promotions into 
Cabinet; and c). was their evidence of a bias towards non-Thatcherites in terms of 
departures from Cabinet?
Before we proceed to summarise our main findings in relation to these research 
questions, it is worth addressing one potential criticism of our numeric focus. It 
could be argued that our approach is problematic as it works on the assumption 
that all posts are of equal value. That is clearly not the case as certain portfolios 
are deemed to be a greater political significance. To counter this accusation, it is 
worth considering the Thatcher Cabinets within the context of a). the political pres-
tige associated with the three ‘great offices of state’—the Treasury, Foreign Office 
and the Home Office; and b). the political significance of where the non-Thatcherite 
wets were placed within the hierarchy of portfolios more generally. These debates 
will help us to assess the assess the validity of the accusation that Thatcher tended 
towards appointing Thatcherites into the key economic portfolios (Evans 2009, p. 
102) and in doing so she ‘isolated’ those critics on the non-Thatcherite right who did 
remain in Cabinet (Smith 1994, p. 351).
Between 1979 and 1990 Thatcher worked with three Chancellors, two of which, 
Howe (1979–1983) and Lawson (1983–1989) would be defined as Thatcherite eco-
nomic liberals; and one (Major 1989–1990) who would be defined as ideologically 
centrist. Her first Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington (1979–1982) was a member 
of the House of Lords, and therefore beyond the parameters of this study, although 
he generally perceived to be a Heathite. Of the following four that she appointed 
two were identifiable as critics of Thatcherism—i.e., Pym (1982–1983) and Hurd 
(1989-); one was an ideological bedfellow, Howe (1983–1989), in economic terms 
but was increasingly distant from her on questions relating to European integration; 
and Major (July to October 1989) was ideologically centrist. She entered office with 
the Heathite, Whitelaw, as her first Home Secretary (1979–1983); before replacing 
him with an ideological sympathiser in the shape of Brittan between 1983–1985. 
Brittan was replaced by the non-Thatcherite Hurd in 1985 and when he moved to 
the Foreign Office in 1989, the ideologically centrist Waddington was drafted into 
the Home Office. Excluding Carrington, of the eight occupants of the great offices 
of state, three were Thatcherites dries—Howe, Lawson and Brittan—and three were 
non-Thatcherite wets—Whitelaw, Pym and Hurd—which hardly amounts to an ide-
ological misuse of patronage. However, it should be noted that between 1983 and 
1985 all three offices of state were occupied by Thatcherites—Lawson at the Treas-
ury; Howe at the Foreign Office and Brittan at the Home Office (Lawson 1992, p. 
225–226).
Can we detect any biases in terms of the types of departments vis-à-vis ideologi-
cal disposition?
If we focus on offices identifiable as core to the Thatcherite economic strat-
egy—i.e., the Treasury (both Chancellor and Chief Secretary) Trade and Industry 
and Employment—then the following emerges. Of those ministers in the House of 
Commons, a total of eighteen Conservatives occupied these four posts across the 
Thatcher era. Of them, one was a Thatcherite critic (Prior at Employment in the first 
two years); seven were identified as ideologically centrist or loyalist (Jenkin, Fowler, 
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King, Parkinson, Rees, McGregor and Major) and ten were Thatcherites (Howe, 
Nott, Joseph, Biffen, Tebbit, Lawson, Ridley, Brittan, Lamont and Lilley). So, the 
suggestion that Thatcher included critics within her Cabinet but isolated them from 
portfolios core to her objectives does carry validity. However, this claim has to be 
placed along the Thatcherite neo-liberal objective of controlling public expenditure 
and here her appointments to the largest spending departments within government—
i.e., Education and Health and Social Security—are also worth assessing. Across 
her Prime Ministerial tenure Thatcher appointed ten Conservatives to these port-
folios. Of these two were ideologically likeminded (Joseph and Moore); four were 
ideologically centrist loyalists (Jenkin; Fowler; McGregor and Newton) and four 
were identifiable as wets: i.e., Carlisle; Baker; Clarke; Waldegrave. These findings 
could suggest a clear link in terms of portfolio type and the ideological disposition 
of those appointed, meaning that there could be some legitimacy to the ideas of mar-
ginalisation, but it does lead to an additional question: why did Thatcher allocate big 
spending departments to ministers identifiable with the more interventionist wing of 
her own party?
On the three central questions which drove this research we can offer the follow-
ing conclusions. First, when it comes to ideological balance within her Cabinet, the 
Norton taxonomy helps us to provide more concrete evidence than has previously 
been available before. From this the balance titled in favour of the non-Thatcherites 
between May 1979 and September 1981. The contentious reshuffle of September 
1981 established a Thatcherite majority within the Cabinet and that majority would 
be sustained until the July 1989 reshuffle which created a balanced Cabinet. The 
mini-reshuffle of October 1989 would lead to the non-Thatcherites outnumbering 
the Thatcherites and this would be sustained for the remainder of her time in office. 
Her final Cabinet had the lowest level of ideological sympathisers of all of her Cabi-
nets (n = 3) and, although the number of ideological centrists (n = 11) was higher at 
the end of her tenure than at any other time, it is also the case that the gap between 
non-Thatcherites and Thatcherites was larger than at any other time (there were six 
non-Thatcherites and only three Thatcherites).
Second, when it comes to the issue of promotions into Cabinet, we can identify 
the following in terms of trends. Excluding herself there were 46 Conservatives 
appointed to the  Cabinet from the House of Commons (all male) and overall, 14 
were non-Thatcherites; 20 were loyalists and 12 were Thatcherites. After her ini-
tial Cabinet of May 1979 was made up of 8 non-Thatcherites; 5 loyalists and 5 
Thatcherites (plus herself), Thatcher subsequently promoted into Cabinet a further 
28 new members, of which 6 were non-Thatcherites; 15 were loyalists and 7 were 
Thatcherites.
Third, when it comes to those departing the Cabinet, we can identify the follow-
ing in terms of trends. Excluding herself, of the 46 Conservatives who served in 
her Cabinets, and then also excluding the 19 who were members of her last Cabi-
net, then we can identify how 27 Conservatives joined and then left her Cabinets. 
Of those who departed again the ideological profile is reasonably balanced: if we 
exclude Parkinson, who departed in 1983 and then re-joined in 1987, 8 were non-
Thatcherites; 9 were loyalists and 9 were Thatcherites. On the question of the form 
of departure it is clear that five of the non-Thatcherites were clearly dismissed: St 
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John Stevans; Gilmour; Carlisle; Pym and Prior (but no wets were dismissed after 
1984), whereas only two of the Thatcherite departures were clearly dismissals: 
Biffen and Moore, in 1987 and 1989 respectively. In terms of policy-based resigna-
tions Thatcher lost more Cabinet members from her own ideological subgroup—
Lawson and Howe—as she did from her critics—Heseltine.
Overall, the Norton taxonomy helps us to challenge the assumptions within the 
existing academic literature about how Thatcher used her powers of patronage in 
a way that was biased in favour of Thatcherites and against non-Thatcherites. The 
archives demonstrate to us that the ideological disposition of Cabinet members was 
clearly a calculation for those advising Thatcher. Her subsequent decision-making 
does demonstrate her desire to shift the balance to the right in September 1981, but 
the archives also enable us to understand the caution that existed in terms of the 
ideological balance of the Cabinet, with the reshuffle of September 1985 being a 
notable example of her desire that her Cabinet was seen to be more ideologically 
balanced. This was achieved by the advancement of a ‘new generation’ of Con-
servatives, whom whilst not ‘instinctive Thatcher supporters’, were ‘happy to serve’ 
(Campbell 2003, p. 225). The ideological significance of the September 1981 
reshuffle is not disputed within this study, but by using the Norton taxonomy as a 
guide, and by exploiting the archival material on subsequent reshuffles it is clear 
that, thereafter, presentational skill (i.e., competence) mattered as much as ideol-
ogy. This study, in effect, sought to test a claim that Thatcher made in her mem-
oirs—that ‘the Cabinet to some extent reflect the varying views in the Parliamentary 
Party’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 418), and it has demonstrated that her appointments (if not 
her portfolio allocation) showed a greater sensitivity to this concern than academics 
have tended to acknowledge. On why, Thatcher would admit that ‘I generally found 
that the (Tory) left seemed to be best at presentation’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 418).
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